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Using unique survey data that allows us to observe both voters’ and politicians’ preferences 
for local public spending as well as voting decisions, this paper tests if voters typically 
support parties in which the politicians’ preferences are closest to their own. Doing so would 
be rational for the voters to do if politicians’ preferences matter for policy outcomes, as is the 
case in e.g. the citizen-candidate model. It is found that this is indeed the case. This finding is 
in line with theoretical models such as the citizen-candidate model arguing that politicians 
cannot credibly commit to election platforms that differ from their true policy preferences. 
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1. Introduction 
When analyzing the democratic decision process within a political economics framework, a 
number of important assumptions must be made. These include, for example, whether 
politicians are office- or policy-motivated, whether they can credibly commit to election 
platforms and whether voters are retrospective or prospective (i.e., whether they react to 
past policies or election promises about the future). Depending on which assumptions are 
made, the predictions from the theoretical models will differ. For example, in the standard 
median voter model first developed by Downs (1957) and Black (1958), both office- and 
policy-motivated politicians will end up with election platforms corresponding to the 
median voter’s most preferred position. If one instead assumes that politicians are policy-
motivated and cannot commit to election promises, the story will be different. Politicians’ 
preferences are then likely to matter for implemented policy, and rational voters 
understanding this will consider politicians’ preferences for different policy issues at the 
election booth.
1 The citizen-candidate model, put forth by Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) 
and Besley and Coate (1997), rely on exactly these assumptions and model politicians as 
citizens with preferences on the same issues as the rest of the citizens, but that have decided 
to run for office. Depending on which assumptions that are made, theoretical models will 
hence end up in different theoretical predictions about, e.g., whether politicians’ 
preferences matter for implemented policies or not. As always, it is in the end an empirical 
question, and recent empirical evidence indicates that parties do matter, which speaks in 
favor of the second class of theoretical models. For example, using a regression-
discontinuity approach, Lee et al. (2004) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) find evidence of a 
partisan effect (i.e., that parties matter for policy outcomes) using data from the U.S. 
congress and Swedish local governments, respectively. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), on the 
other hand, do not find any evidence of a partisan effect in U.S. cities.  
 
A shortcoming of the above mentioned empirical studies is that even though they can 
credibly estimate causal partisan effects, they are silent on the mechanism to why parties 
                                                 
1 Alesina (1988) first established that politicians with policy preferences would not be able to commit to a 
policy that is opposed to their own preferences.  3
matter, and to what extent voters are aware of politicians’ preferences and take these into 
account when casting their votes. The aim of this paper is to dig deeper into the mechanism 
in place and examine whether voters’ care about politicians’ preferences when voting and 
elect politician with preferences most like their own.
2 Given that politicians cannot commit 
to election platforms, this is what we would expect. On the one hand, if the median voter 
model is correct, the politicians’ preferences should not matter for the outcome and voters 
should not care about these preferences. It could also be the case that voters are not aware 
of the preferences of politicians, in which case they would simply not be able to select the 
“right” politicians. Hence, even if earlier studies have found that politicians’ identities 
matter for the outcome, more information is needed in order to understand which 
theoretical model that best describe the behavior of politicians and voters. The value added 
of our paper is thus that we test the assumptions behind the models rather than the 
predictions from the models. 
 
Testing whether voters vote for the political candidate who has preferences most like their 
own is quite demanding of data. We need information about both the voters’ and the 
politicians’ preferences for certain policies as well as information on how voters actually 
cast their votes. In this paper, we will combine survey data from local elections with 
register data from Swedish local governments. Most importantly, both the voters and the 
elected politicians answer identical questions about their preferences for local public 
spending and tax rates. Furthermore, voters are asked for which party they voted.  
 
                                                 
2 The question of whether voters vote for the candidates with preferences most like their own is also 
of great interest in the political science literature, where two competing models have been put forth: 
the proximity model and the directional model. The proximity model predicts that voters vote for 
the party with preferences closest to their own, as in Downs’s classical model, whereas the 
directional model predicts that voters vote for the party favoring their own side and prefer a more 
”intense” party on their own side to a less intense party. There has been a debate in political science 
on whether the proximity model or the directional voting model works best. Macdonald, Listhaug 
and Rabinowitz (1991) claim that the directional model is superior, whereas Westholm (1997, 
2001) claims that there is no support for the directional model. Finally, Lewis and King (1999) state 
that there is no good test supporting either model.  4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the role of local 
governments in Sweden, the party structure at the local level and how political decisions 
are made. In Section 3, we propose a theoretical model describing voting behavior in a 
situation where voters observe politicians’ preferences and consider these at the election 
booth. Section 4 presents the different data sources and our dataset. Section 5 discusses the 
empirical specifications corresponding to the theoretical model. The results are presented in 
Section 6, and finally, Section 7 concludes. 
  
2. Local governments in Sweden 
In this paper, we focus on elections to the municipal councils in Swedish local 
governments. Two main factors make Swedish municipalities a good testing ground for 
theories of political decision-making. First, Sweden has a long tradition of strong and 
autonomous local governments. The degree of autonomy refers both to the right to decide 
on the provision of local public services (above certain minimum standards) and to the right 
to set the local income tax rate. Hence, local politicians are able to affect economic policy 
and the level of local public spending. Second, the local public sector plays a dominant role 
in the Swedish economy. It is responsible for supplying the lion’s share of the welfare 
services provided by Swedish governments. Furthermore, municipal expenditures make up 
approximately 25 percent of the GDP, and approximately 20 percent of people employed in 
Sweden are employed by the municipalities. Hence, the decisions made at the local level 
are of great importance for the voters, and we can expect voters to care about the decisions 
made at the local level. 
 
The political decisions at the local level are made by municipal councils elected in local 
elections. Sweden has a proportional election system, and until 1994, the local elections 
were held every third year on the same day as the election for the central government. 
Sweden is (and has been) characterized by a multi-party system where the parties typically 
can be divided into two different political blocs, one right-wing and one left-wing. The 
parties that are represented at the central level are typically also present at the local level. In 
addition, there are a number of local parties. In this paper, we use data collected in  5
connection with the local elections in 1979 and 1991. In 1979, four right-wing parties (m, 
fp, c, kd) and four left-wing parties (s, v, sk, sa) existed, of which the Social Democrats (s) 
were by far the largest. In 1991, an environmental party (mp) and a right-wing populist 
party (nyd) had emerged.
3 In this paper, we will primarily treat the different parties as two 
political blocs, as is done in Alesina et al. (1997). During the studied period, coalitions 
across these two political blocs were very rare at the Swedish local government level. As a 
sensitivity analysis we will also treat the different parties as separate units. 
 
At the elections, the voters do not choose politicians directly but choose between different 
lists presented by the different parties. These lists contain the names of politicians from the 
party running for election. The parties have also ranked the candidates, meaning that the 
first candidate on the list will get the first seat that the party wins in the municipal council, 
the second candidate on the list will get the second seat, and so on. It is possible for a voter 
to delete a candidate that he does not like from the list or to choose a candidate that he likes 
the most. For these changes to actually matter, however, several voters must make the same 
choices. 
 
As mentioned above, the data we use in the paper was collected in connection with the 
1979 and 1991 elections. Therefore, it is relevant to look back in time and discuss the 
responsibilities and sources of revenue of the Swedish municipalities at those times. In 
1979, the two most important responsibilities of the local governments were supplying 
childcare and care for the elderly. In addition, they were responsible for social assistance 
and the local infrastructure. The responsibility for schooling was at the central level, 
although the municipalities were responsible for providing school buildings, meals for the 
pupils and some additional material. In 1991, the responsibility for schooling was 
decentralized from the central to the local level, increasing the role of local governments. 
There are three main revenue sources for Swedish municipalities: their own tax revenues 
(from a proportional income tax), grants from the central government and fees. The local 
                                                 
3 See Table A1 in the appendix for a description of the different parties and their vote share at the 
central level.  6
income tax discretion in Sweden has been set by the constitution since 1974. The median 
municipal tax rate was fairly constant at around 17 percent from 1979 to 1991, but with a 
rather large distribution, from a minimum tax rate around 10 percent to a maximum just 
below 20 percent. Tax revenues constitute the major revenue source; from a share of 
approximately 40 percent in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, tax revenues had 
increased their share to slightly over 50 percent in the early 2000s. In 1979, the tax revenue 
share was 44 percent, and in 1991, it was 49 percent. While intergovernmental grants had a 
rather constant share from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s of between 20 and 26 percent, 
their share had fallen to below 15 percent in the early 2000s. In 1979, the share of grants 
was 23 percent, and in 1991, it was 26 percent. The same trend can be observed for fees as 
for grants, but at a lower share: the share of fees decreased from around 17 percent (in both 
1979 and 1991) to below eight percent in the early 2000s. From the mid-1970s to the early 
1990s, the pattern regarding all revenue sources shows a fairly similar trend.  
 
To sum up, Swedish local governments are important suppliers of welfare services, and the 
local politicians have a large degree of freedom when it comes to setting the local tax rate 
as well as determining the level of public spending. Swedish local governments therefore 
make an excellent testing ground for how politicians’ preferences affect voters’ decisions. 
 
3. Theoretical model 
The aim of this paper is to test whether voters vote for the political candidate whose 
preferences are most in line with their own preferences. To define the empirical 
specifications we will in this section propose a simple theoretical model.  
 
We assume the role of the political system is to determine the level of local public spending 
denoted by g. There are two parties, L and R; politicians with high preferences for public 
spending have merged into party L, and politicians with low preferences have merged into 
party R. Denote the bliss points of the two parties as  L g  and  R g  respectively, with  L g > R g .  
  7
Voters have preferences over the level of public consumption. They also have party-
specific preferences over the two parties. Let bi measure individual i’s ideological bias in 
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utility given the two political options. Thus, voter i will vote for party L iff  
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Given the distribution function of bi, we can express the probability that voter i will vote for 
party L as 
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Rewriting this expression, we can express it as follows: 
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Hence, an individual will vote in favor of party L if the policy preferred by party L is closer 
to the individual’s preferences than the policy preferred by party R. Thus, the relative 
distance to two parties affects individuals’ voting decisions. If voters vote for the party with 
preferences closest to their own, then β will be positive. 
 
4. Data 
To test whether voters vote for politicians who have preferences that most closely match 
their own, we will combine data from three data sources in Sweden: data from surveys 
directed at voters, data from surveys directed at local politicians, and aggregate municipal  8
level data. The combined data provide us with what we consider a unique data set that is 
well suited for testing the hypothesis.  
 
The surveys we use were conducted by political scientists in connection with the local 
elections in 1979 and 1993. They were directed at a random sample of citizens in a 
stratified sample of Swedish municipalities and at all elected politicians in these 
municipalities (except in 1993, when a sample of politicians was drawn).
4 The 
municipalities were chosen to represent different types of municipalities with respect to 
population and population density. We observe the preferences and the background 
characteristics of the voters just before the election and those of the politicians after the 
election. The pooled cross section covers 25 municipalities and 2,805 individuals (1,626 
voters; 1,179 politicians) for the 1979 election and 28 municipalities and 8,353 individuals 
(6,952 voters; 1,401 politicians) for the 1991 election. 
 
Because we want to test whether voters vote for the politicians whose preferences are most 
in line with their own, we need to observe policy preferences for both voters and 
politicians. This is possible since the surveys use the same questions for both groups. 
Because the local governments supply the bulk of the welfare services in Sweden and 
finance these largely through local taxes, it is likely that the size of the local public sector is 
important for the voters. Therefore, in the estimations, we use a survey question that asked 
the respondents (both politicians and voters) about their preferences for local public 
services and taxes. Specifically, the question is stated as follows: 
 
“Consider the following claim: It is more urgent to lower the local taxes than to 
raise the level of local services. Do you 
1.  agree completely 
                                                 
44 The reply frequency in the surveys was fairly high, but with some variation over the years. In the 
1979/80 survey, the figures were 82% for the voters and 77% for the politicians. In the 1991/93 
survey, 46% of the voters and 79% of the politicians replied. The lower reply frequency among 
voters in 1991 was probably a result of the fact that the 1991 survey was conducted via mail rather 
than through direct interviews.   9
2.  agree  
3.  disagree  
4.  disagree strongly 
5.  have no opinion” 
 
One benefit of the way this question is stated is that it takes into account individuals’ 
willingness to pay for a higher level of public service. Furthermore, it is formulated exactly 
the same way for voters and politicians. A potential problem with our data is that the voters 
and the politicians answer this question in different years, the voters in the election year and 
the politicians in the post-election year. If the tax rates and spending levels change between 
these two points in time, we cannot directly compare the answers given by voters and 
politicians. In the next section, we will discuss how we handle this potential problem. 
 
The survey data give us the preferences of each politician. However, voters do not elect 
politicians directly, but vote for parties. Therefore, we need to aggregate the preferences of 
the politicians into party preferences or preferences of a political bloc. We will assume that 
the preferences of each bloc can be represented by the preferences of the median politician 
within each bloc. Figure 1 provides box- and whisker plots of these median politicians’ 







Figure 1: Observed median politicians’ preferences for total local public spending, by bloc 
(1979 and 1991) 
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Right
Left
Notes: 1) The lines indicate the lower and upper adjacent values of the median politicians’ 
preferences, considering the median value at each municipality. The colored area represents the 
values of the median politicians’ preferences between the 25
th and 75
th percentile. 2) Preferences = 1 
if “agree completely”, = 2 if “agree”, = 3 if “disagree”, and = 4 if “disagree strongly”. 
 
From the box plot in Figure 1, we observe that there are clear differences in the preferences 
on local public expenditure between politicians belonging to the two different political 
blocs, which is a requirement to observe that politicians’ preferences matter for voters’ 
voting decisions. We also observe, as expected, that left-wing politicians have preferences 
towards higher local public expenditure than right-wing politicians do, indicating that there 
is indeed a left-right dimension to the size of the local public sector. 
 
In Figure 2, we plot the median politicians’ preferences by parties. We observe that there 
are clear differences across parties, especially among those belonging to the right-wing bloc 
(the parties belonging to the right-wing bloc are those above the dotted line in Figure 2). 
We also observe that within blocs, those parties that have more extreme ideological 











Figure 2: Observed preferences for total local public spending, median by parties (1979 
and 1991) 










Notes: See Figure 1. The left-wing bloc consists of the parties Socialdemokraterna (s), Vänsterpartiet (v) and 
Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti (sk) and Arbetarpartiet kommunisterna (ak) in 1979; s, v and Miljöpartiet (m) 
in 1991. The other parties belong to the right-wing bloc. 
 
In addition to the survey question regarding general preferences for locally provided public 
services, the surveys also include questions regarding preferences for specific public 
services such as schooling, childcare and social care. These questions are formulated in the 
following way: 
 
  “Certain activities for which the municipalities are responsible are presented below. 
Please indicate whether you feel that 
1.  it is urgent that your municipality does more than it is doing at present 
2.  generally speaking, things are satisfactory at present 
3.  the effort of the municipality could be diminished 
4.  you have no opinion about it.” 
  12
Because an increase/decrease in spending is linked to an increase/decrease in taxes, it is 
important to link the answer of the latter question to the willingness to pay, which is 
indicated by the former question. Following Ahlin and Johansson (2001), we combine the 
reported preferences for an increased/decreased level of spending with preferences for a tax 
increase/decrease. 
 
In addition to preferences for local public spending, voters are also asked whether they 
intend to vote in the upcoming local election and, if so, for which party. One may worry 
that voters do not truthfully report their voting intentions. It is therefore reassuring that the 
vote shares obtained by blocs as well as by the different parties in the local elections are 
quite similar to the distribution of the answers given by the respondents in our sample for 
how they intend to vote (see Table A2 in the appendix). Pooling the two local elections, the 
vote share obtained by the left-wing bloc in those municipalities was 49.34%, and among 
the individuals in our sample, it was 48.35% percent. We know from the data to which 
party the politicians belong.  
 
In Table 1, we report summary statistics for the politicians’ preferences for total local 
public spending, schooling, childcare and social care, respectively, according to whether 
they belong to the left-wing or right-wing bloc. We observe that the politicians of the left-
wing bloc have statistically significant different preferences than those in the right-wing 
bloc. We performed a simple t-test on the equality of means for the median preferences by 
blocs considering all municipalities. In all cases, we can reject the null hypothesis that they 
are equal. We also observe that preferences differ more between the two blocs when it 
comes to spending on childcare and social care and that the preferences differ the least for 









Table 1: Summary statistics for the median politicians’ preferences by municipalities (1979 
and 1991) 
  Mean  Max Min St d Test different mean 
         t [p-value] 




Right-wing bloc  2.429  3.500 1.500 0.503   
Left-wing bloc  3.311  4.000 2.000 0.836   




Right-wing bloc  2.398  3.000 1.000 0.575   
Left-wing bloc  2.717  3.000 2.000 0.435   




Right-wing bloc  1.645  3.000 1.000 0.565   
Left-wing bloc  2.567  3.000 2.000 0.485   




Right-wing bloc  1.446  2.000 1.000 0.478   
Left-wing bloc  2.177  3.000 2.000 0.367   
Note: the null hypothesis of the test on the equality of means is H0: mean(Right-wing bloc preferences – Left-
wing bloc preferences) = 0. 
 
We perform the empirical analysis using, separately, the preferences for these four 
questions. It could be the case that depending on the salience of each issue, only the 
politicians’ preferences on some issues are important for voters’ voting decisions.  
 
In our final sample, we have 4,055 voters’ observations (1,243 for 1979; 2.812 for 1991). 
The reduction of the sample is due to the fact that not all individuals answered all the 
questions. Table 2 below describes some summary statistics for the full sample as well as 
the restricted samples that we use when analyzing preferences for the four different 
spending categories. As can be seen from the table, politicians answered the survey 
questions to a greater extent than the voters (80% vs. 50%). The questions concerning 
preferences are answered less often by voters. Nevertheless, because the average 
preferences for local public spending and the personal characteristics of the voters are  14
nearly the same in the full sample of the survey as in our sample, our sample is quite likely 
not biased.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics: All the individuals included in the survey and our samples 
(1979 and 1991) 
  Voters Politicians 
   Mean  Std. dev. No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. 
No. of 
obs.
Survey           
Pref. for total 
spending  2.654  1.074 4,853 2.893 1.031  2,057
Schooling pref.  2.173  0.791 3,892 2.423 0.707  2,248
Childcare pref.  2.214  0.800 3,182 2.192 0.787  2,240
Social care pref.  1.636  0.764 2,812 1.928 0.711  2,119
Vote for left-wing  0.367  0.615 8,578 0.511 0.526  2,580
Education  0.375  0.484 4,963 0.557 0.497  2,295
Female  0.498  0.500 8,551 0.307 0.461  2,580
Age  44.7  16.8 8,551 54.1 12.2  2,580
Married  0.601  0.490 8,217 0.860 0.347  2,299
Total spending sample          
Pref. for total 
spending  2.659  1.077 4,055 2.896 1.032  2,023
Vote for left-wing  0.483  0.496 4,055 0.484 0.500  2,023
Education  0.393  0.488 4,055 0.559 0.497  2,023
Female  0.471  0.499 4,055 0.301 0.459  2,023
Age  45.0  16.2 4,055 56.2 11.3  2,023
Married  0.671  0.470 4,055 0.858 0.350  2,023
Schooling sample          
Schooling pref.  2.185  0.790 3,277 2.424 0.707  2,211
Vote for left-wing  0.441  0.497 3,277 0.488 0.5  2,211
Childcare sample          
Childcare pref.  2.224  0.796 2,675 2.194 0.787  2,205
Vote for left-wing  0.457  0.498 2,675 0.49 0.5  2,205
Social care sample          
Social care pref.  1.63  0.760 2338 1.931 0.711  2084
Vote for left-wing  0.447  0.497 2338 0.494 0.5  2084
Notes: The right-wing bloc is composed of the parties Ny demokrati, Moderata samlingspartiet, Folkpartiet, 
Centerpartiet and Kristen demokratisk samling. The left-wing bloc is composed of the parties 
Socialdemokraterna, Vänsterpartiet, Sveriges kommunistiska parti, Miljöpartiet - de gröna. Female=1 for 
females, 0 for males; Married=1 if married, 0 if single. Education=1 if the individual has more than two years 
of secondary schooling, 0 otherwise. 
  15
The sample used in the analysis of the preferences for specific public services are not 
exactly the same because voters tend to answer the preference questions regarding specific 
public services less often. Nonetheless, all three samples are representative (see Table 2). 
 
5. Empirical considerations 
In the empirical analysis, we estimate the following linear probability model:
5  
 








ijt u X v P






jt ijt Pref Pref   and 
L
jt ijt Pref Pref   are the absolute difference between the ith voter’s 
preferences in municipality  j in election year t (Prefijt ) and the median preferences of the 
right-wing and left-wing politicians in region j in election year t  (
R
jt Pref  and 
L
jt Pref ), 
respectively. 
k
ijt X  is a set of k control variables that might affect both the voters’ voting 
behavior and the difference between the voters’ and the politicians’ preferences;  jt   are 
municipal-specific constants that pick up unobserved municipal-specific variables that 
might affect both the voters’ voting behavior and the difference between the voters’ and the 
politicians’ preferences. The empirical specification in equation [4] corresponds to the 
theoretical specification in equation [3]. Hence, if voters vote for the party whose 
preferences are closest to their own, β will be positive. We estimate the model in equation 
[4] both for general preferences and for preferences for the three different spending 
                                                 
5 We use the linear probability model to get easier and more direct interpretations of the parameter 
estimates. The conclusions do not change if we use a probit or a logit model instead. 
1 if individual i in municipality j votesleft in election year t 
0 if the individual votes right.
L




categories (schooling, childcare and social care). In addition, we also estimate equation [4] 
by parties rather than by blocs. See the appendix for the empirical specification in this case. 
 
Before turning to the results, there is one more thing that we need to consider. As 
mentioned in section 4, the preferences of the voters are measured at a different point in 
time than the preferences of the politicians. Furthermore, the questions are stated in such a 
way that the respondents relate their preferred level of spending and taxes to those that are 
in place when the survey is performed. If the tax rates and spending levels change between 
the survey directed to the voters and the survey directed to the politicians, we cannot 
compare the answers given by voters and politicians directly.
6 To solve this problem, we 
normalize the stated preferences with respect to the actual spending levels. More 
specifically, we first estimate the following equation using OLS: 
 
  it jt t ijt u J e Expenditur J    Pref  .                    [5] 
 
We then use the estimated residuals from equation [5] as our measure of the voters’ and the 
politicians’ preferences for the locally provided services: 
 
      jt t ijt ijt J e Expenditur J J ˆ Pref Pref Estimated   .                [6] 
 
Hence, the estimated preferences are given by the unexplained variation in the stated 
preferences after controlling for the variation given by the expenditure levels. As can be 
seen from Table 3, the correlations between these estimated preferences and the answers 




                                                 
6 See Table A3 in the appendix for the summary statistics of the different expenditure categories 
and local tax rate in the years that the surveys were conducted.  17
 
Table 3: Correlation between observed and estimated preferences 
 
 Voters  Politicians 
 Total  1979 1991 Total  1979  1991
Total spending  0.89  0.99 0.85 0.93 0.98  0.91
Schooling 0.91  0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92  0.93
Child care  0.78  0.65 0.86 0.78 0.68  0.85
Social care  0.71  0.69 0.72 0.66 0.57  0.71
 
 
In the empirical analysis, we estimate all models using both the actual answers (the 
observed preferences) and the answers estimated by equation [6] (the estimated 
preferences). Given that they are highly correlated, we do not expect to find different 
results when we use observed or estimated preferences. To account for the fact that we have 
an estimated regressor, we use bootstrap standard errors when drawing inferences about  . 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Baseline results 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether voters vote for the political bloc (or political 
party) that yields the closest match between the voters’ and politicians’ preferences. Hence, 
it is assumed that the voter calculates the distance between his own preferences and those 
of the right-wing bloc and compares this with the distance between his own preferences and 
those of the left-wing bloc. If the distance to the right-wing bloc is larger than the distance 
to the left-wing bloc, then the voter will vote for the left-wing bloc. Table 4 reports the 
results when testing this hypothesis using preferences for total local public spending. 
Column (i) shows the result using observed preferences and pooling the two years, whereas 
columns (ii) and (iii) estimate the model for the two elections separately. Because the 
responsibilities and the parties making up the two blocs changed between the two years, the 
effects may differ between the two years. Finally, columns (iv), (v) and (vi) do the same 
thing, but they take into account that politicians and voters answered the questions at 
different points in time. Therefore, they use estimated preferences instead.   18
Table 4: The effects of politicians’ preferences on the probability of voting for the left-
wing party: total local public spending 
  Observed preferences  Estimated preferences 
  Both years  1979  1991  Both years 1979  1991 








(0.006) (0.022) (0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.006) 








  (0.016) (0.032) (0.018) (0.017) (0.032) (0.017) 
Female  -0.010 -0.024 -0.010 -0.012 -0.024 -0.014 














 (2.98e-05)  (5.79e-05) (3.45e-05) (3.04e-05) (6.52e-05)  (3.48e-05) 
Married  0.011 0.050 -0.012 0.008 0.050 -0.017 








  (0.132) (0.168) (0.095) (0.070) (0.111) (0.075) 
        
Observations  4,055 1,243 2,812 4,055 1,243 2,812 
R-squared  0.135 0.100 0.161 0.139 0.100 0.169 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses (bootstrap standard errors, 200 rep., when using estimated preferences, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The models include municipality-specific effects. 
 
 
The estimated coefficients indicate that voters do, in fact, vote for the political bloc that has 
preferences that are closest to those they hold themselves. However, the result is 
completely driven by the election in 1991; the parameter for 1979 is both statistically and 
economically insignificant. In addition, we conclude that the way we measure preferences 
(observed or estimated) does not really matter; the results are almost identical in the two 
different cases. Looking at the control variables, we see that the likelihood for voting for 
the left-wing bloc, holding the preferences of the voter constant, decreases with education. 
 
As we mentioned in section 4, it might be the case that not all issues are equally important 
for the voters, but that voters consider some spending categories more salient, and the 
politicians’ preferences for these spending categories matter more for their voting 
decisions. Therefore, we have estimated our model for three different spending categories: 
schooling, childcare and social care (see Table 5).   19
 
Table 5: The effects of politicians’ preferences on the probability of voting for the left-
wing party: different public spending categories 
  Observed preferences  Estimated preferences 
  Both years  1979  1991  Both years  1979  1991 
 Childcare        







in  preferences  (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) 
        
Observations  2,675 882 1,793  2,675 882 1,793 
R-squared  0.076 0.107 0.066 0.076 0.107 0.065 
 Social care        







in  preferences  (0.013) (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.030) (0.020) 
        
Observations  2,338 723 1,615  2,338 723 1,615 
R-squared  0.126 0.138 0.128 0.123 0.136 0.125 
 Schooling        
Relative distance   0.026
** 0.025  0.025 0.027
* 0.024 0.026 
in  preferences  (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) 
        
Observations  3,277 1,041 2,236 3,277 1,041 2,236 
R-squared  0.076 0.107 0.066 0.076 0.107 0.065 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (bootstrap standard errors, 200 rep., when using estimated preferences, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The models control for a number of individual characteristics (education, 
female, age age^2, married) as well as municipality-specific effects. See the appendix for the parameter 
estimates for the other coefficients. 
 
 
Starting with the results for childcare presented in the top panel of the table, we can 
conclude that voters seem to vote for the politicians (political bloc) whose preferences are 
most in line with their own. The parameter estimates fall around 0.08 and are statistically 
significant at the one percent significance level, regardless of whether we use observed or 
estimated preferences and regardless of which year we use. The results for social care, 
presented in the middle panel of the table, are very similar to those for childcare, but with 
point estimates that are somewhat higher in all specifications. It can also be noted that when 
comparing the two elections, social care is considered a more salient issue for the voters in 
the 1991 election than in the 1979 election; the parameter estimate is almost twice as large 
in the latter election. Finally, from the results presented in the bottom panel of Table 5, the 
results for schooling are weaker than for childcare and social care. The parameter estimates 
are lower (around 0.026) and statistically significant only when both elections are pooled.  20
However, even though the statistical significance disappears when the model is estimated 
for the two elections separately, the point estimates remain almost identical. In sum, we 
conclude that there is indeed an effect of the relative distance between the voters’ and the 
politicians’ preferences on the voters’ voting behavior.  
 
Are the results found in Table 5 of any economic significance? One way to investigate this 
is to relate the coefficients to the variation in the explanatory and dependent variable. This 
is done in Table 6. From the table, we can learn that, for instance, an increase of one 
standard deviation in the relative distance of preferences to the right-wing bloc and the left-
wing bloc, respectively, will increase the probability of voting for the left-wing bloc by 
10.8 percentage points, moving the probability of voting left, on average, from 
approximately 0.48 to 0.59 (an increase of 23%). Relating this change to the variation in the 
probability of voting for the left bloc, one standard deviation in the ratio of preference 
differences will increase the probability of voting for the left-wing bloc by a standard 
deviation of 0.22. We believe this effect to be economically significant. Comparing the 
result for general preferences with those for preferences for schooling, childcare and social 
care, it seems an increase of one standard deviation in the relative distances in preferences 
between right-wing and left-wing blocs matters most for general preferences and for 
preferences on social care. For schooling, the effect seems to be of minor economic 
significance.  
  21
Table 6: Economic significance of the estimates 
 
Estimated 
coefficient ( ˆ ) 
 
Std. dev.  
(Relative 


















          
Preferences for 
total spending.  0.100  1.077  0.496  0.108  0.217 
Preferences for 
schooling 0.026  0.790  0.497  0.021  0.041 
Preferences for 
childcare 0.078  0.796  0.498  0.062  0.125 
Preferences for 
social care  0.128  0.760  0.497  0.097  0.196 
           
 
 
6.2 Robustness check – estimations by party 
Even though Sweden is a country with more than two political parties, we have thus far 
performed the analysis as if voters could choose between only two political blocs. Because 
it is very rare for any single party to win a majority of the seats at the local (or central) 
elections, parties typically form coalitions for a majority. These coalitions typically follow 
a left-right-wing scale, where it is possible to distinguish between parties in a left-wing 
coalition and those in a right-wing coalition. This fact, together with the finding in Figure 2 
about the median preferences of politicians within different parties, makes us relatively 
confident that this is not a major shortcoming. 
 
However, it is still the case that voters cast their vote for parties, not for blocs, even though 
they are probably aware that when voting for a right-wing party, they typically also vote in 
favor of the other parties in the right-wing bloc. Next, we will examine the sensitivity of 
our results by investigating whether voters vote for the party whose preferences are closest 
to their own compared to those of other parties. Conducting this analysis is not 
straightforward. We need to limit the sample of municipalities to those in which the same 
parties are running for office. Because there are some local parties in some municipalities  22
and because some of the central parties are very small, the sample is limited. We have 
chosen to focus on 1991 and the municipalities in which the following parties, and no 
others, ran for election: m, fp, c, kd, nyd, s, v and mp. Restricting the sample this way 
means that our sample is reduced to 967 voters living in only nine different municipalities. 
The results are thus less representative for the country than the results presented so far.
7 
 
Table 7 shows the result of a multivariate probit regression where the Social Democratic 
party (s) is the base category. We have chosen this party as a base category because it is the 
largest party. A negative point estimate for a party indicates that it is less likely that the 
voter will vote for that party if the distance between his own preferences and those of the 
party is larger than the distance between the voter’s preferences and the preferences of the 
Social Democrats. 
 
In reviewing the results, we see that the point estimates for the parties belonging to the 
right-wing bloc are all negative. For three parties (m, fp and kd), the point estimates are 
also statistically significant. For the parties belonging to the left-wing bloc, the point 
estimates are both statistically and economically non-significant (they are all close to zero).  
 
                                                 
7 When looking at the data in 1979, we only had a sample of 407 observations living in 8 
municipalities. Estimating the model by party for that election, we did not find any statistically 
significant results.  23
Table 7: Results by party. Observed preferences for total local public spending, the 1991-
election Base category: The Social Democratic Party (s) 
 Right-wing  bloc  Left-wing  bloc 
 M  Fp  c  kd  nyd  v  mp 
                       
Relative distance 
in preferences  -0.463
*** -0.454
*** -0.185 -0.335
** -0.063  0.009  -0.003 
  (0.079) (0.099) (0.125) (0.137) (0.176) (0.142) (0.137) 








  (0.187) (0.237) (0.285) (0.353) (0.412) (0.341) (0.351) 
Female -0.335
* 0.165 -0.164 -0.279 -0.790
* -0.708
** 0.158 
  (0.178) (0.223) (0.270) (0.328) (0.412) (0.323) (0.328) 
Age -0.104




  (0.034) (0.044) (0.050) (0.060) (0.075) (0.076) (0.064) 
Age
2 0.001
*** -0.000  0.001
* 0.001
* 0.000  -0.002
** -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married  0.226 -0.091 0.257 0.126 -0.422 -0.123 -0.573 
  (0.215) (0.257) (0.333) (0.401) (0.466) (0.365) (0.358) 
Constant 1.107  -1.647
* -0.597 -0.789 -0.531  -4.620
*** -4.251
*** 
  (0.760) (0.974) (1.153) (1.354) (1.609) (1.613) (1.490) 
         
Observations  967        
R-squared  0.09        
Municipalities  9        
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The models include municipality-specific effects. 
 
 
Even though the much smaller sample size makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions 
based on the estimations by party, we believe that the results are in line with those from our 
baseline estimates: the preferences of the politicians matter for voters at the election booth.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have shown that voters take politicians’ preferences into account when 
voting. More specifically, voters vote for the political bloc or political party whose 
preferences are most similar to their own preferences. This effect is not only statistically 
significant but is also economically significant. If the relative distance between the voter’s 
own preferences for total local public spending for the right-wing bloc compared to the 
preferences of the left-wing bloc increases by one standard deviation, the likelihood that the  24
voter will vote for the left-wing bloc increases by almost 11 percentage points. 
Distinguishing between different spending categories (schooling, childcare and social care), 
we find that the preferences of the politicians for all of these services matter for voters’ 
voting decisions. We also find that the voters in the 1979 and 1991 elections seem to have 
considered childcare and social care more salient issues than schooling.  
 
The fact that politicians’ preferences matter for voters’ voting decisions is in line with the 
assumptions made in the citizen-candidate model, i.e. that voters will understand that 
politicians will implement their most preferred policy if elected and vote accordingly. 
Furthermore, the fact that we observe differences between the preferences of the two blocs 
is in line with the prediction from the citizen-candidate model with two candidates. 
 
We do not observe the election platforms announced by the different blocs. Therefore, we 
cannot determine whether politicians also announce platforms in line with their preferences 
or if they announce the median voter’s most preferred policy as predicted by the median 
voter model. However, we can say two things. First, if their election platforms are not in 
line with their preferences, voters still take the preferences of the politicians into account, 
indicating that their election platforms are not credible. Second, if politicians do announce 
policy platforms according to their preferences, there is no policy convergence. This 
finding contradicts the prediction from the median voter model that both parties will 
announce platforms according to the median voter’s preferences. 
 
To sum up, our findings are in line with the assumptions made in theoretical models that 
argue that politicians’ preferences matter for policy outcomes. More specifically, our 
results indicate that the citizen-candidate model is a better description of political decision 
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Appendix A: Tables  
 
 
Table A1: The Swedish parties 
Name in Swedish  Abbr.  Ideological position  Vote share (%) 
in the central 
election 1979 
Vote share (%) 
in the central 
election 1991 
Moderata Samlingspartiet  m  Conservative  20.3  21.9 
        
Folkpartiet Liberalerna  fp  Liberal  10.6  9.1 
        
Centerpartiet c  Non-socialist,   18.1  8.5 
   Farmers     
Kristdemokratiska Samhälls-  kd  Christian   1.4  7.1 
Partiet   Democratic  (conservative)     
        
Ny Demokrati  nyd  Right-wing Populists  -  6.7 
        
Miljöpartiet de gröna  mp  Green/New Politics  -  3.4 
        
Socialdemokratiska Arbetar-  s  Social Democrats (labor)  43.2  37.7 
Partiet        
        
Vänsterpartiet v  Left-wing  (former  5.6  4.5 
   Communist)     
Sveriges kommunistiska parti  sk  Communist  -  - 
        




Table A2: Vote share in the local elections 
  Sample Municipalities 
  Total  1979 1991 Total 1979  1991
        
Moderata samlingspartiet  19.99  15.38 22.10 21.28 16.86  23.34
Folkpartiet  10.08  9.12 10.52 10.98 9.84  11.52
Centerpartiet  15.94  24.15 12.18 11.58 18.92  8.17
Kristen demokratisk samling  4.00  1.48 5.16 4.38 2.17  5.41
Ny demokrati  1.63  0.00 2.38 2.43 0.00  3.57
Socialdemokraterna  40.18  46.57 37.26 40.46 46.03  37.86
Vänsterpartiet  4.41  2.87 5.12 5.41 5.29  5.46
apk+skp  3.76 0.43 5.28       
Miljöpartiet      3.48 0.90  4.68
        
Right-wing bloc  51.65  50.13 52.34 50.66 47.78  52.01
Left-wing bloc  48.35  49.87 47.66 49.34 52.22  47.99 27
Table A3: Summary statistics of the different expenditure categories and the local tax rate  
 Mean 
Std. 
dev.  Max  Min  No. of obs. Mean 
Std. 
dev.  Max  Min  No. of obs.
                  
Voters  1979         1991       
Schooling 6,921  1,000  876  5,333  25  7,479  1,009  9,618  5,666  28 
Childcare 1,851  818  4,398  626  25 4,034  915  6,545  2,835 28 
Social care  425  262  1,434  145  25  1,475  712  3,847  724  28 
Local tax rate  16.0  1.2  18.2  13.8  25  17.0  2.8  30.3  14.3  28 
                
Politicians  1980         1993       
                
Schooling 7,011  993  8,821  5,325  25  7,321  1014  9,476  5,534  28 
Childcare 2,033  857  4,737  779  25 3,943  944  6,831  2,825 28 
Social  care  355  237 1,238 88  25  1,824  810  4,656  525  28 
Local tax rate  16.0  1.2  18.2  13.8  25  19.5  2.5  30.3  16.2  28 
 
 
Table A4: The effects of politicians’ preferences on the probability of voting for the left-
wing party: spending on schooling 
 Observed  Estimated 
  Both years  1979  1991  Both years 1979  1991 




** 0.025  0.025 0.027
* 0.024 0.026 
(0.013) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) 








  (0.018) (0.034) (0.021) (0.019) (0.036) (0.021) 
Female  0.017 -0.010 0.025 0.017 -0.010 0.025 


















Married  -0.010 0.033 -0.033 -0.010 0.033 -0.033 








  (0.139) (0.178) (0.117) (0.091) (0.136) (0.086) 
        
Observations  3,277 1,041 2,236 3,277 1,041 2,236 
R-squared  0.076 0.107 0.066 0.076 0.107 0.065 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors (200 rep.) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A5: The effects of politicians’ preferences on the probability of voting for the left-
wing party: spending on childcare 
 Observed    Estimated 










(0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) 








  (0.020) (0.036) (0.023) (0.019) (0.035) (0.022) 
Female  0.001 -0.049 0.025 0.001 -0.052 0.026 
  (0.019) (0.033) (0.023) (0.019) (0.032) (0.022) 
Age 0.011
***  -0.006 0.019***  0.011*** -0.006 0.019*** 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
Age2 -1.14e
-4*** 4.38e
-5 -1.86  e
-4*** -1.15e
-4*** 4.22e-05 -1.86  e
-4***
 (4.04e-05)  (7.32e-05) (4.84e-05) (3.76e-05) (7.41e-05)  (4.92e-05) 
Married  -0.003 0.032 -0.028 -0.004 0.030 -0.029 








  (0.148) (0.218) (0.134) (0.091) (0.147) (0.099) 
Observations 2,675  882  1,793  2,675  882  1,793 
R-squared  0.105 0.129 0.101 0.106 0.134 0.100 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors (200 rep.) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table A6: The effects of politicians’ preferences on the probability of voting for the left-
wing party: spending on social care 
 Observed  Estimated 










(0.013) (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.030) (0.020) 








  (0.021) (0.043) (0.025) (0.023) (0.044) (0.023) 
Female  0.018 0.034 0.008 0.017 0.032 0.007 
  (0.020) (0.037) (0.024) (0.022) (0.039) (0.023) 
Age  0.007* -0.009  0.014***  0.007* -0.009  0.014
*** 








 (3.92e-05)  (7.33e-05) (4.63e-05) (4.27e-05) (7.51e-05)  (4.77e-05) 
Married 0.012  0.083
* -0.029 0.017 0.085
** -0.022 








  (0.154) (0.230) (0.134) (0.092) (0.157) (0.111) 
Observations 2,338  723  1,615  2,338  723  1,615 
R-squared  0.126 0.138 0.128 0.123 0.136 0.125 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors (200 rep.) in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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, 
where p=m, fp, c, kd, v, and the base category is party s. 
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